REMAKING URBAN CITIZENSHIP

ORGANIZATIONS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY

COMPARATIVE URBAN AND COMMUNITY RESEARCH, VOLUME 10

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Urban Citizenship in New York, Paris, and Barcelona: Immigrant Organizations and the Right to Inhabit the City

Ernesto Castañeda

Building on ethno-surveys and multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork conducted in New York, Paris, and Barcelona, this chapter discusses immigrant representation, ethnic organizations, urban citizenship rights, and minority political participation in these cities. It describes how organizations and institutions differently mediate immigrant political incorporation, social integration, and structural assimilation given the different social, political, and institutional contexts of each city. Structural assimilation is defined by Milton Gordon as the moment when immigrant groups enter "fully into the societal network of [mainstream and powerful] groups and institutions" (Gordon, 1964, cited in Jiménez, 2010, p. 71). This would include the opportunity for upward social mobility, the lack of residential segregation, intermarriage, and the potential for participation in politics and public activities as equals (Gordon, 1964). The prospect of structural assimilation is important to understand the immigrants' objective and subjective belonging to the cities where they live. For undocumented immigrants, establishing their collective right to inhabit a new city first and foremost is crucial in opening the door for a further "right to the city," which entails the ability to fully participate and transform the cities where they live to the benefit of its inhabitants over that of capital (Lefebvre, 1968). Different ideas of what constitute legitimate political and cultural organizations provide distinct avenues to participate politically in urban life.

After comparing organizational fields in different countries, I find that while most immigrants are not members of neighborhood, city-wide, national, ethnic, or hometown associations, the mere possibility of existence and survival of these organizations explains much about the context of immigration and the relationship that individuals have with the state. Immigrant associations help newcomers integrate through language, vocational and cultural workshops, and legal advice. They also help with practical issues of labor, food, housing, education, and self-esteem. But immigrant and minority organizations also play a key role in mobilizing dispersed immigrants with common origins and cultural backgrounds to make claims upon the state by engaging in contentious politics in the public arena or by lobbying and meeting with politicians and city officials at private events. Associations can be crucial in channeling immigrant discontent by voicing immigrant needs, making collective political claims, combining efforts, and dissipating discontent and alienation—even when they fail to obtain all of their explicit demands (Castañeda, 2010).

Despite the commonly observed organizational shortcomings, budgetary dire straits, internal divisions, inter-organizational competition, and the rise and disappearance of ethnic associations,
the mere existence of these organizations is an indicator of the degree of political voice of minorities and immigrants in a city regardless of formal citizenship. Associations can only thrive in a welcoming cultural and institutional environment (thus, their partly derivative nature), but once associations are taken seriously by city governments, they have important effects that cannot be reduced to individual actions. Minority associations, then, are socially productive actors with emergent properties (McQuarrie and Marwell, 2009).

Institutional Fields and Contexts of Reception

Organizations' actions and campaigns matter, but the legal and cultural frameworks that regulate them may matter even more since organizations are interested in achieving legitimacy by looking like other organizations in their field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; McQuarrie and Marwell, 2009; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Immigrant organizations are rendered more or less legitimate by types of citizenship regimes, legal and bureaucratic precedents and procedures, official immigration histories, and mythologies. While these organizational fields are very dense in New York and Barcelona where undocumented immigrants can sometimes act as *de facto* urban citizens, this does not happen so easily in Paris where new ethnic organizations are viewed as threatening and as antithetical to the French republican model of theoretical ontological individual equality and homogeneity (Bowen, 2007). More surprisingly, the weakness of ethnic associations in the Parisian metropolitan area ends up reducing the right to the city of descendants of immigrants, who, despite being legal French citizens, suffer high levels of discrimination, racial profiling, and unemployment (Silberman, Alba, and Fournier, 2007). The comparison between these cities shows that the right to the city goes beyond legal citizenship binaries. A collective right to the city is more empowering and self-fulfilling than an individualized, neo-liberal matching of resident and neighborhood based on income and cultural taste, or the price of real estate, restaurant menus, and entertainment venues.

In the formation of local organizational fields, historical precedence, international emulation, and diffusion matter (Longhofer and Schofer, 2010; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001; Tilly, 1984). The model and watershed moment for ethnic organizations is the American civil rights movement. In the United States the civil rights movement was to a certain degree successfully institutionalized into law, collective memory, and social and political organizations. The US has historically emphasized race in talking about social differences, while historically class and religious differences have been more salient in France and Spain (Fassin and Fassin, 2006). Immigrants thus move into different contexts of reception with different possible avenues for political voice.

Ethnic and immigrant organizations play key roles by providing personal and institutional intermediaries, leaders, spokespersons, and even token minorities and successful immigrant stories for public consumption, while also tackling some of the many thorny issues faced by this underpaid and vulnerable population. Following a long tradition of urban ethnic politics formerly controlled by Irish, Italians, and others, Latino immigrant elites in New York have employed ethnic politics and local patron-client relations. Puerto Ricans and Dominicans have done so successfully in New York (Marwell, 2004; 2007) and Mexicans are increasingly trying to do so (Dávila, 2004; R. C. Smith, 2006). French citizens of color have taken note of the American context (often idealizing it) and have tried to borrow many of the organizational forms of American ethnic politics; yet, lacking a similarly deep institutional supporting infrastructure, they are perceived by outsiders in a very different manner. While the NAACP, the National
Council of La Raza, the American Civil Liberties Union, Congressional Caucuses, and other organizations may receive some federal, state, and local funds or tax breaks—often in combination with private donations—they are often seen by their members and by third parties as independent. In contrast, equivalent organizations created or supported by the French state are seen as direct agents of the state; they are to be distrusted as neutral bodies. The government of Barcelona, even though it lacks an experience parallel to that of New York, has been successful to a great degree in implementing policies that give economic support for immigrant clubs. These official clubs have allowed immigrant participants to shape organizational activities and programs in a way that involves their communities and makes them feel like they have a right and place in the city.

McQuarrie and Marwell (2009) call for a more careful look at organizations when studying urban issues. They write:

> [O]rganizations look and act the way they do because of the pressure for conformity to or legitimacy in a wider institutional field. […] Considering the dynamics of the communities and cities in which organizations are situated could yield positive contributions to organizational theory and urban sociology (pp. 259-60).

It is indeed fruitful to focus upon immigrant and transnational organizations *per se*, and this chapter adds to this research agenda.

### Data and Methodology

This chapter raises an important caveat for migration scholars: when looking at the immigrant experience only through the statements of the spokesmen and leaders of community based organizations (CBOs), consular offices, non-governmental associations (NGOs), or hometown associations (HTAs), one cannot comprehend the perils and daily life experiences of regular immigrants in the way that one can by conducting in-depth interviews or engaging in non-participant observation with immigrants themselves (whether or not they engage in collective action or participate as members of immigrant associations). Unfortunately, when looking for "representative immigrants" to interview, journalists and new researchers of immigration are often tempted to contact immigrant associations and those non-governmental organizations whose explicit purpose is to support or oppose immigration. By doing this, one gets a polarized and politicized perspective while missing much of the action in the middle. This is the case because, as with the general population, most people are not active members of voluntary organizations. This, however, does not mean that the existence—or lack thereof—of ethnic associations is irrelevant to the right to the city and general life chances of immigrants and minorities.

This chapter proposes that one should simultaneously study both immigrant organizations and relatively isolated immigrants in order to better assess the effects and limitations that immigrant organizations have on polity and community. The chapter thus draws on ethnographic surveys, in-depth interviews, and non-participant (or direct observation) conducted between 2003 and 2010 in the cities of New York, Paris, and Barcelona, as well as in three migrant-sending countries: Mexico, Algeria, and Morocco (Castañeda, 2010). The samples are purposive, seeking to include individuals who differ along lines of occupation, neighborhood, gender, class, race, generation, and political orientation. Many of the immigrants in the sample are first generation economic migrants working low skilled jobs. To get at processes of racialization and systematic
exclusion, the samples in New York, Paris, and Barcelona also include second- and third-generation immigrants. To control for class I have also surveyed professional, highly skilled Mexican migrants living in the United States and Europe. The samples were not randomly generated from a general directory or a census of minorities, since the latter does not exist in the Parisian case. The samples used are small, and thus, their generalizability is limited. The percentages shown in the tables below should not be taken as precise or absolute. Yet the trends are robust across cities and are similarly reported from both the sending and receiving communities. The trends discovered follow a social-class logic; that is, the higher the education level, the higher the participation in civil life and civil associations and politics in general. This coincides with traditional findings of voting and political behavior (Verba and Nie, 1972; Wolfinger and Rosentone, 1980, cited in Jones-Correa, 1998, p. 53).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location Population</th>
<th>Receiving Cities</th>
<th>Mexican Professionals Living Abroad</th>
<th>Sending Countries</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Paris N Afr</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barcelona N Afr</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NYC Latinos</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USA Mx Pro</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain Mx Pro</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France Mx Pro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Algeria Mx Pro</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco Mx Pro</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico Mx Pro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N Afr</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N Afr</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Latinos</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td></td>
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<td>USA Mx Pro</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Spain Mx Pro</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France Mx Pro</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Algeria Mx Pro</td>
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<td>41.7</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco Mx Pro</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mexico Mx Pro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<td>27.8%</td>
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<td>58.3%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>29%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ethno-survey results are triangulated and calibrated with data collected through participant observation, expert interviews, informal and in-depth interviews (not included in these sample numbers), as well as from secondary sources, census data, and survey results from large random samples (when existent). Relatively small sample sizes and a qualitative methodology allow for a closer inspection of the cases (Small, 2009) and for the observation of processes and mechanisms in different contexts leading to fruitful comparisons (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007).

Comparative Field Sites and the Derivative Salience of Immigrant Associations

Despite the French reluctance to recognize communitarian organizations (Bowen, 2007), when I arrived in France and I said that I wanted to interview immigrants, many people recommended that I contact immigrant associations: "How else would you find immigrants to interview?" They felt this would be the only way to find and interview immigrants. I decided against this approach since, while I am familiar with many Mexican associations in New York, I know that the average Mexican immigrant worker is not an active member of any of them. I suspected that in France the percentage would be even lower. Desiring to avoid sampling on the dependent variable, I talked to typical immigrants, whether or not they were politically organized or belonged to a hometown association or other transnational organization (see Table 2).

I conducted fieldwork for seven years in New York with Mexican immigrants and transnational organizations of all types including undocumented migrants, legal residents, American citizens, later-generation Mexican Americans, international students, and professionals. As a direct observer, I became familiar with the leaders and agendas of many migrant organizations, and I regularly attended their events. Yet I focused purposely on those
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immigrants who were not part of any of these organizations, since they constituted a numerical majority of immigrants and often their concerns and attitudes were very different from those expressed in public by those who are identified as community leaders. Political views and participation vary widely across class and generation. Drawing from in-depth interviews in California and Kansas, Jiménez (2010) writes that, "Later-generation Mexican Americans are not likely to spearhead a demonstration or a social movement advocating for immigrant rights. If we look at Mexican Americans' engagement only in the most visible forms of 'ethnic action'—protest politics, organizational involvement, and participation in an ethnic enclave—we miss the important ways that they create unity with and division from Mexican immigrants in daily life" (2010, p. 248). This is not unique to the United States.

When I arrived in Paris in 2007 to conduct fieldwork for a year, some local researchers advised me to contact immigrant associations in order to get in touch with this "hard to reach population." This answer is indicative of a larger social phenomenon across field sites: oftentimes (though not always) a newcomer may approach an organization for lack of personal familiarity with a certain ethnic group or a perceived social distance that may make unscripted or informal interactions with members of this group in public places a rare occurrence. It is in these contexts where immigrant *porte-paroles*, or spokespeople, gain more salience and can act as important cultural brokers. Not surprisingly, in Paris, immigrants experience strong spatial, symbolic, and social boundaries (Castañeda, forthcoming; Lamont, 2000; Lamont and Molnar, 2002), thus explaining the temptation to rely on local associations. Unfortunately there are few national or city-wide organizations representing migrants, and migrant needs vary across class and ethnic lines. The group-specific associations are often seen as illegitimate by the government and the dominant class since they go against French republican ideology (Bowen, 2007).

While doing fieldwork in Barcelona, I had no difficulty interacting and talking to immigrants in public places. Inside community centers one could hardly differentiate the immigrant component and the official governmental policies and funding sources that supported these initiatives of intercultural dialogue and active integration. The link between governmental funding in Barcelona is much more transparent than in New York and less paternalistic and nationalistic than in Paris. Writing in reference to Barcelona, Morales and Jorba (2010) state:

> Other than specific actions that must be undertaken for assuring the adequate initial settlement of newcomers to the city, migrants' integration is viewed as a 'natural' process that will emerge from migrants' equal access to all social welfare and services provided by the city, which are based on the same principles and requirements [as] for pre-existing residents (p. 272).

The goal is to have immigrants on the same playing field as locals; accordingly, immigrants tend to feel at home in and have rights in Barcelona. The Catalan state likes to connect with the immigrant communities through individuals and cultural collectives. There are important organizations in Barcelona which speak, for example, in favor of and in the name of Muslims whenever their community is attacked or addressed. Media consult them and cite their views. The print media take these leaders seriously and offer them a space in the Iberian public sphere, especially when it concerns issues touching on Islam in Spain. One of these often cited spokespeople is Mohammed Halhoul of the *Consejo Islámico Cultural de Catalunya* or Cultural Islamic Council of Catalonia. The Catalanian organization is similar to, but probably a more organic and "real" organization than, the *Conseil Français du Culte Musulman* (CFCM) or the French Council of Muslim Religion, an official body created by the French government in 2003 to create a "French secular Islam." The CFCM is seen by average Muslim immigrants from
North Africa as not representing them (Strieff, 2006). This was true in my sample, even though most people were non-strict Muslims who were rather secular in the public sphere and who were very acculturated to French mores and values.

When I actually asked immigrants and their families if they were part of an association (club, HTA, or cultural organization) most respondents answered in the negative. The Moroccan sample had the highest participation rate, with most of the membership belonging to trade associations of vendors rather than political organizations. Class also plays a role in participation in political, social, and cultural organizations. Thus the sample of Mexican professionals abroad had the largest number of respondents participating in civil society associations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Paris</th>
<th>Barcelona</th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Mx Pro</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>na</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the generally small participation of working class immigrants (and natives) in civil associations it would have been problematic to have interviewed only members of associations. Furthermore, if, when studying overall immigrant political participation, I had only concentrated on politicized and organized immigrants, I would have been "selecting on the dependent variable" (Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt, 1999). Yet it would be wrong to fully dismiss immigrant organizations as secondary since they reflect much of the institutional environment into which immigrants arrive. When such organizations manage to survive they can be socially productive and performative when calling for the right to the city of everyone regardless of their place of birth. Thus, the interesting sociological paradox: while most immigrants are NOT members of ethnic, civil, or social organizations, the existence, health, resources, and respect that these organizations have in a city can be taken as an indicator of the rights and freedoms that immigrants are allowed to have despite nationality, religion, or legal status.

**Immigrant Organizations, Associations Ethniques, Colectivos Migrantes**

Not all lobbies and ethnic associations are treated the same way by host governments. Local, national, and international politics affect the way the host state deals with particular groups. In the United States, Cuban or Jewish organizations carry different political weight than, for example, Salvadorian or Guatemalan organizations (Menjívar, 2006). The French state is suspicious of Algerian associations given the historical role of anti-colonial associations in Paris, most notoriously the Algerian nationalist group *Etoile Nord Africaine* founded by Messali Hadj in Paris in 1926, which acted as the forerunner of Algerian independentist groups like the Algerian National Liberation Front (Rosenberg, 2006). The further criminalization of Islam in the eyes of the West after the Iranian revolution (Deltombe, 2005), combined with the strong secular and even anti-religious *habitus* of many French politicians (Kuru, 2008), takes away much legitimacy from Muslim associations that are independent of the French state. To control and co-opt movements, the French government has tried in recent years to create a version of Islam that is more compatible with French traditions (Strieff, 2006). These efforts have been top-
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down and rather unsuccessful in connecting with the average French Muslim citizen. Contradictorily, the French government and society have been very supportive of Kabyle and Berber cultural and political organizations, which they see as distinct from the Arab ones. The Berbers, or Imazighen, as they prefer to be called, were the main inhabitants of North Africa before the Arab invasion of the seventh century. Cultural and political differences still exist between these groups, especially in Algeria. Unlike Arab or Muslim associations, Kabyle groups have been quite active in the Parisian region since they started migrating there at the beginning of the twentieth century. The French state has seen Kabyles as being closer to Europeans and Christianity and as a population through which to democratize North Africa (Mahé, 2006).

The Imazighen participate more in organizations. The integration of many of them into well-paying jobs in their host society allows them more time and resources to organize. They make claims to have their language and culture recognized, but not as much vis-à-vis their host societies as they do in relation to what they see as a historical and continuous "Arab" cultural colonization, exacerbated by a bloody confrontation with Algerian forces in the Black Spring of 2001 (Mahé, 2006).6

With the exception of the Kabyles, most first generation immigrants from the Maghreb are not organized socially, politically, or even religiously. While they may feel part of the umma, or global Muslim community, they do not go regularly to a Mosque, and most of them prefer to confine their religious activities to the private space of the household and around traditional familial practices, such as fasting during Ramadan. One informant told me that it is only possible to follow the tradition of Ramadan when done within a community, since someone—commonly a wife, sister, or mother—is needed to prepare the rich food that will be eaten by working and/or observing men in order to recover their strength after the sun sets. Thus most first generation working immigrants who are single or came alone rarely follow Ramadan. This further alienates them from each other; in their countries of origin, following this collective tradition had the effect of making the community visible.

Given the French republican normative and legal system that discourages the formation of associations or clubs around common nationality or religion,7 Muslim Maghrebis lack a uniform political voice. There is dire misrepresentation of minorities within government and even in the slots for electoral posts (Geisser and Soum, 2008). Some token figures have been appointed by President Sarkozy, but French minorities do not feel represented by them at all (personal interview with Eros Sana, May 28, 2009). In the same sense the French government has established an official body in the Paris Mosque and a Muslim Council, but these are official organs that have very little contact with immigrants. The same is said about the well funded and visible organization "SOS Racisme," which many criticize as an arm of the Socialist Party that lacks any contacts on the ground and is especially disconnected from youth of Maghrebi origin (L'Information Citoyenne, 2006).

In Barcelona, immigrants who fail to learn Catalonia's language and history are sometimes seen as a cultural and political threat to the aspirations of many for fuller autonomy from Spain. Catalan nationalists sometimes see immigrants who embrace the Spanish language, but not Catalan, as a way in which their claim to be a distinct nation gets diluted. Thus efforts are made to teach Catalan language, culture, and history to the newcomers as a way to keep Catalonia alive. Despite local nationalism and certain xenophobic comments by locals, the Moroccan immigrants interviewed feel at home in Barcelona and make efforts to learn Spanish and Catalan. They have created new lives in Barcelona that often surpass the struggles they faced in their
place of birth. As a Mexican interviewee in the US said, "Your country is where you succeed." This also represents the view of many Moroccans in Barcelona.

"Community"

To the question, "Do you feel part of a community?" respondents in the countries of arrival answered as shown in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>Barcelona</th>
<th>Paris</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In my sample, levels of participation often reflect cultural and institutional differences and not just participation in associations. One way to get at this is to further qualify a quantitative comparison by looking at the different and contextual meanings of the words "community," "communauté," and "comunidad" in New York, Paris, and Barcelona metropolitan areas respectively. Given the long history of the French nation-making project (E. J. Weber, 1976), in France "community" is a dirty word and "communautariste" is a put-down (Bowen, 2007; Wacquant, 2008). Not surprisingly immigrants in France report the lowest levels of communitarianism while the US has relatively high levels. Alexis de Tocqueville would not be surprised with these well-established differences in associational life (Tocqueville, 1969). In New York many respondents identified with a community, whether a neighborhood, their national or ethnic group, or the Latino or Hispanic pan-ethnicity. "New Yorker" and "American" were also salient identities. The percentage is even higher for Moroccans in Spain. While many reported feeling part of the umma, a transnational Muslim community, many also reported feeling part of a Spanish, Catalan, or cosmopolitan community. Clearly what the immigrants understood by the question depends on the context of reception and on their pre- and post-migration conceptions of community. For example, by not reporting participation in ethnic associations, French residents of immigrant origin are actively showing their normative incorporation into France's dominant culture. This accommodation is at strong odds with the frequently familistic and collectivistic North African habitus. This rejection of Muslim or North African associations further reduces the social capital of immigrants in France, thus hindering, for example, the incorporation and political participation of unemployed citizens of foreign origin.

The meaning of community differs widely in these three cities. As Patricia Hill Collins (2010) notes, the term "community" can be used politically under various guises. The idea of community often assumes homogeneity but "the city is where difference lives" (Mitchell, 2003, p. 18), so a real urban community should necessarily be heterogeneous. Yet for some it means a minority community; for others it means an older demographic and conservative politics; for others it has religious connotations. Thus, it is the case that "community" entails the definitional exclusion of others who are not part of it (e.g., immigrants). Thus immigrants are expected to assimilate or show that they are an important part of spatial multiethnic communities. They may
have to self-organize to show what Tilly calls their WUNC—worth, unity, numbers, and commitment—as a categorical group in order to be taken seriously by local politicians and to be given a say in policy making (Jones-Correa, 1998; Tilly, 2004).

Do ethnic organizations and coalitions actually change contemporary modes of urban authority? While immigrant associations are celebrated as part of the cultural richness of New York, the real political power of most of them is merely symbolic. There is a strong inertia benefitting the political status quo that favors well-established older immigrant groups: Jews, Irish, and Italians (Jones-Correa, 1998). Elites from the dominant group often do not welcome candidates from a new immigrant group until the demographic reality forces them to do so (Dávila, 2004). Thus inter-ethnic alliances at the institutional-political level are few beyond those on Election Day.

At the social movement level there are a few temporal exemptions. The Immigrants’ Rights Coalition, the committee organizing the May 1st marches, and associations like Make the Road have tried to create—with some success—pan-Latino alliances, coalitions with some African American community leaders around social policies, and mobilizations with Asian and Arab Americans around immigrant rights. Human rights groups, labor unions, and Catholic and Protestant organizations have also been instrumental in mobilizing for immigrant rights and creating broader coalitions in these three cities.

The Barcelonan government often promotes its network of voluntary associations and partnerships with the city as a successful model to integrate immigrants. Although imperfect, the system has indeed been successful. However, perceived cultural differences and government policies that treat immigrant groups in a differential manner—implicitly favoring Latin American immigration (Rius Sant, 2007)—often divide collectives of Latinos and North Africans. And while there are Latin American coalitions, partnerships, and pan-ethnic parades like La Fiesta de la Hispanidad on October 12 (Columbus Day), the bulk of the associations are divided by national origin, and then by particular region, profession, etc. (Morales and Jorba, 2010).

The tendency in Paris is for associations to form around geographical areas (Maghreb, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, North America, etc.), but the national differences and politics make these coalitions unstable and thus often unsuccessful in lobbying as a block. In the 1980s the beur movement had some provisional successes in bringing positive attention to the children of North African immigrants (Barsali, Freland, and Vincent, 2003). Currently some of the most interesting, and potentially most influential, groups are: Les Indigènes de la République, characterized by their smart manifesto against colonialism and the disenfranchisement of immigrants from the former colonies; Siècle 21, a group of successful professionals of color extolling the virtues of diversity and calling for affirmative-action-type programs in elite schools, top government posts, and big companies for educated minorities; and Le Conseil Représentatif des Associations Noires de France (CRAN), which is an association that asks for the political representation of French Blacks following both an American civil rights movement type of discourse and a French republican integrationist one. They often compare themselves to the NAACP, yet its President often talks against "communitarism" (Lozes, 2011)! Many see CRAN as a platform by which its leaders gain attention, are co-opted, and gain government positions. This was what happened with the leaders coming from the beur movement, SOS Racisme (Malik, 1990), and others. So while a couple of spokespeople get jobs in the system, their supposed constituencies see no real empowerment.
Discrimination, Exclusion, and Contentious Politics

While racial profiling happens in the streets and subways in New York City, especially since the rise of the "law and order" ideology (Wacquant, 2008; 2010), Maghrebis in France report the highest degree of police harassment. When I asked Maghrebis in Paris if they have had any problems with the police or the judicial system in general, the majority of them answered in the negative. But when I asked if they had been stopped and searched by the police for no apparent reason, the majority responded in the affirmative. Many of them even justified this by saying that they were used to these searches or that they thought the searches were normal. This is an example of how widespread and normalized the practice is, and it translates into an underreporting of police abuse in France. The surveys provide many other indicators of widespread discrimination, racism, and police harassment against "Arabs" in France. A study published in 2009 indicates that at the Châtelet train and subway station in Paris, blacks were 11.5 times more likely than whites to be stopped; and Arabs were 14.8 more times more likely to be stopped simply for wearing clothing associated with youth culture (Goris, Jobard, and Lévy, 2009).

Below, in Table 4, are answers to the question "Have you ever been unjustly stopped by the police?" from my surveys samples.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>Barcelona</th>
<th>Paris</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The streets and subway stations in Barcelona (and especially Madrid) have seen a rise in racial profiling in recent years; Maghrebis and Latinos may be stopped and asked for documentation just because of their phenotype. This is done with the intention to deport the undocumented. The media and the larger and most vocal immigrant organizations have criticized this profiling. While the purpose of these laws is to target only the undocumented, racial profiling has the effect of making whole categorically defined groups feel like they do not belong to a city.

A touchy event amongst the Mexican professional community living in Spain has been the case of engineering doctoral student Alejandro Ordaz Moreno. He was the victim of mistaken identity in Seville in 2008. While coming home from a bar on a weekend night, two policemen dressed as civilians tried to arrest him; he thought they were criminals trying to kidnap him. He defended himself by retaliating and allegedly took a weapon from one of the agents who finally subdued him and charged him with attacking the officers. The professional Mexican community in Spain, including the diplomatic delegation, interpreted the event as a result of the racialization of Mexicans and was very active in advocating for the student. Such an assault on persons of their educational and class standing added to the dissatisfaction of some Mexicans working in Spain, especially since they had expected to encounter racial and cultural similarities.
Table 5. Participation in Contentious Politics (in percentages)

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>Barcelona</th>
<th>Paris</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n a</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In New York the participation in public protests (Table 5) refers to the marches of May 1, 2006, and marches in subsequent years in favor of immigrant rights. The most active individuals also have marched in favor of or against the war in Afghanistan and other issues important for New York activists. The French immigrant second generation gained much attention after the riots in 2005. These riots reflect their lack of political representation in government and the lack of avenues for political voice. The reported engagement of Parisian Maghrebis in contentious politics is relatively high in relation to their counterparts in Barcelona or New York, but it is still relatively low given the high level of political contention typical in France (Bréchon and Tchernia, 2009). Furthermore, much of their reported participation in contentious politics entails transnational participation in pro-democracy and minority rights movements in Morocco and Algeria, as well as in marches in France against the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the situation in Palestine. Context matters, and participation in sanctioned protests is higher because of labor issues. Yet, it is not the unemployed and disenfranchised North Africans who participate in protest in Paris but the most integrated ones.

When French youth riot and attack public buildings and private property (e.g., as occurred in 2005), it should not be seen as innovative or outside of French cultural frames and repertoires of contention. Actually, they are borrowing performances from the historical repertoires of contentious politics performed by people in France (Tilly, 2008; Traugott, 1993). French history is full of small riots and rebellions against local figures of symbolic and real authority as well as against private property and members of the local aristocracy. While in the US the media commonly underline the cultural, symbolic, ideological, and political transgressions of the 1960s, the French recall and underline the riots, the occupation of the streets and universities, the construction of street barricades made with paving stones, and the resulting violent state repression, cultural incomprehension, and symbolic repression that accompanied and followed 1968.

In Barcelona, immigrants are fast to participate in anti-racist and anti-xenophobic marches along with the young people of Spanish descent who also play a leading role. New immigrants show their incorporation by fully participating in the public celebrations of sport and the local cultural celebrations (I can personally attest to their participation at the victory of Spain in the EuroCup in June 2008, at the victory of the Real Madrid Football Club in the same year, and in the celebration of the bicentennial of the events of 1808). In sum, immigrants also show their integration by adapting to the relevant contentious repertoires of a locality. Thus the contentious actions of the Maghrebi origin youth show their adoption of French current and historical forms of contentious political participation and collective action (Traugott, 1993). So while Maghrebis have some voice through contentious politics on certain topics (labor, benefits, the environment), they have fewer institutional avenues inside the political system to have their demands addressed than Latinos.
Latinos have not been free from attacks in the public sphere or in the streets; but, the barriers they have faced—like California's Proposition 187 passed in 1994, the anti-immigrant law HR 4437 proposed by Republican congressman James Sensenbrenner, and Arizona's recent enactment of SB 1070—have actually galvanized the Latino community and brought it together in reaction to these repressive laws targeting immigrants and their allies. The institutionalization of lobbying, letter writing, marching, and other contentious performances in the American mainstream political system have resulted in the lessening of the effects of these laws or their eventual outright defeat, often by being ruled unconstitutional in the federal judicial system.

Each legal attack against Latino immigrants results in larger calls for legalization of the undocumented and the naturalization of legal permanent residents (green card holders). Over time, the result is a larger number of Latino citizens and therefore a larger Latino voting bloc. Furthermore, new citizens can petition to legally reunify with family members left behind. This, along with natural growth and continued immigration, has resulted in Latinos becoming the largest minority in the US. While not all vote (or do so for the same party), there are enough commonalities in outlooks and interest, often cutting across class lines and national origin, to constitute them as a voting bloc, which increases their influence and political voice, if only moderately. This stands in stark contrast to the case of Muslims in France. Latino citizens have expressed their political voice by voting in the last federal elections, giving needed votes to Democratic candidates. Since Latinos participate mostly through accepted institutional channels they may be seen as docile or even "a-political" since their actions in many ways cannot be distinguished from those of African Americans, Mormons, Evangelicals, the National Rifle Association (NRA), or other advocacy groups.

The US is a federal system with diverse laws, state-society negotiations, and service and tax incentives that vary by state and locality; yet, its public sphere is largely national, so whatever happens in a state or county can affect the national imagination. A set of policies may have a demonstration effect that influences citizens and politicians in other states. The context of a whole country opens up so many more avenues and possibilities than a city can. This is more the case for the US and Spain than it is for France. The US, for example, can range from having "sanctuary cities" like New York and San Francisco, to efforts in Los Angeles to deflect migration (Light, 2006), to the extreme of Sheriff Joe Arpaio of Maricopa County in Arizona, whose theatrics include parading apprehended undocumented immigrants in orange suits and handcuffs through downtown areas and holding them in open-air prisons.

**Paths and Contexts of Immigrant Political Participation and Contention**

While Latinos' life chances are still behind those of whites (Massey, 2007), spaces for Latino figures to access important public roles have opened due to policy, the widespread practice of respect, the tolerance of difference, and avenues for meritocratic advancement (e.g., Bill Richardson, Alberto González, Antonio Villaraigosa, Sonia Sotomayor). There are many Latino politicians in New York, and indeed Latinos hold public office in many places throughout the US. Mexican and other Latino leaders with national and international profiles serve as models of achievement to immigrant leaders in New York and inspire hopes for their own future inclusion. A good example of Latino political institutionalization is the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO), which, according to its own website, "is committed to promoting the advancement and policymaking success of Latino elected and appointed officials." According to NALEO (2007), there were 3,743 Latino elected officials in 1996 and
5,129 in 2007, with 24 Latinos in the US House of Representatives in 2008 and 3 in the Senate. After Ken Salazar became Secretary of the Interior and Mel Martinez (R-FL) retired, Robert Menendez (D-NJ) became the only Latino Senator in 2009. Even if under-represented in relation to their population share, Latinos and other ethnic and racial minorities have representatives at all levels of government. This is less the case in Spain given the short period in which immigration has occurred. Yet there are cases of prominent Latino and Muslim politicians and leaders there. France lacks elected representatives of color except those coming from overseas colonies (Geisser and Soum, 2008). Thus the number of people of color in the French Senate decreased in the twentieth century after the independence of many of its colonies (Shepard, 2006).

An important difference between New York, Paris, and Barcelona is the profile that immigrant and minority organizations, business, and civic associations have in each city. New York City has a long tradition of ethnic mutual-aid societies. Some of them were founded by Jewish immigrants at the end of the nineteenth century to help these immigrants integrate into the city and to cover their basic needs. (The Jewish Board of Family and Children Services, for instance, has offices in all New York City boroughs. It is the largest social service agency in the city, and today it serves a majority non-Jewish population.) New York also has a long tradition of ethnic newspapers, radio, and television, which diffuse important information in the native tongue of the newcomers about the communities of origin as well as information about how to make the most out of the host city. Ethnic media may also act as a way to build social capital among immigrant groups by advertising events and the activities of immigrant and community organizations.

New York's relative openness to immigrants can be explained by demographics, history, and official memory. Around 40 percent of the population of New York is foreign-born, so immigrants and their children are not necessarily a numerical minority. New York has been an important entry point for new immigrants for well over a century. Part of the official history of the city and the country paints Ellis Island as a key point in the history of welcoming immigrants to the United States, even though this positive celebration dates only to the past few decades (Gabaccia, 2010; Zolberg, 2006).

For centuries Paris has also been a popular destination for immigrants. One in five French have foreign-born parents. Yet France's history of immigration is something that is not officially celebrated or generally recognized (Noiriel, 2006 [1988]). Paris has few private institutions that have specifically catered to immigrant needs. Because of the pressure to leave behind previous cultural traditions and the need to integrate immigrants to their new homeland as individuals, belonging to ethnic or nation-of-origin mutual aid societies is generally discouraged.

In Paris, social capital among working class immigrants is much lower than in New York and Barcelona. French law aims at not making distinctions between types of citizens. Thus it is deemed unconstitutional to provide funds for subsets or ethnic categories of French citizens. Therefore, the type of funding that New York or Barcelona city governments now routinely give to private and public organizations that cater to immigrants is illegal in France. Sometimes Paris and its surrounding suburbs do violate this constraint by supporting immigrant and minority organizations at the local level through funds for cultural activities and festivals that, while represented as having a universal cultural value, have mainly a first- and second-generation immigrant constituency in mind (Doytcheva, 2007).

Much has been made in the last decades of the rise of "associations" in France, which are formed by and for immigrants. Yet there is a stigma when talking about them and an implicit
condemnation of their aims and methods. There are important exceptions such as SOS Racisme (L’Information Citoyenne, 2006) and Ni Putes Ni Soumises (Neither Whores nor Submissive) (Amara and Zappi, 2006), organizations that have been fully co-opted by political parties and governments for electoral reasons and for public relations campaigns (Malik, 1990). These organizations have resources, media, national presence, and connections with celebrities and politicians; they use French republican and nationalistic statements in their antiracists campaigns. Immigrants and their children, however, rarely feel represented by them.

Today, Barcelona better resembles New York; ethnic organizations are able to get their own funds or to apply competitively for partial funding of their own proposed civil and cultural programs that aim both to showcase immigrant communities’ food, music, dance, literature, and plastic arts to the Catalon community and to integrate immigrant communities into Catalan and Spanish cultures. Like New York, Barcelona has parades and holidays to celebrate the contributions of general and particular immigrant groups. In contrast, no high-profile member of the Sarkozy-Fillon government was present to inaugurate the new immigration museum in Paris, which is situated in a building that used to house a museum displaying French colonies (Blandin, 2007). So in the case of Paris, it is both the hostile environment of the receiving city and the lack of cultural associations that cause immigrants to feel as though they do not have a right to the city.

Urban Citizenship: Actual Claims-making and Belonging

The standard sociological story of the formation of cities in Medieval Europe describes them as the migrant destinations of craftsmen, liberal professionals, and traveling merchants—as well as free souls, fugitive slaves, soldiers, serfs, criminals, and dispossessed peasants—where residents could live outside the control of feudal lords, kings, and religious authorities. The German phrase Stadtluft macht frei nach Jahr und Tag (“city air makes you free after a year and a day”) originates from the legal principle in the network of Hanseatic cities, where if a person lived in the city for more than a year and one day without a lord or employer making claim on him, then that person would be free of his previous bonds (Sennett, 1994, p. 151). Burger or citizen was the word used to designate the residents of a city, those who, with their dwellings and daily economic activity, established de facto local residence without the permission of any external authority (M. Weber, 1958).

After the American and French revolutions and the rise and global spread of the nation-state model (Wimmer and Feinstein, 2010), cities became parts of larger national units. Urban residents had to increasingly plead before a taxing national government for permission to be legal residents, and foreign-born residents had to request to be naturalized as citizens of the state in question (Ngai, 2004; Weil, 2008). This arrangement between the state and its citizens has become normalized. Thus, international migrants, who are often by definition non-citizens, have to deal with consequences in many arenas—abstract political theory, imagined homogenous communities, public opinion, police and other state agents—in order to exercise their right to inhabit the city as equals. By living their daily lives in the city and interacting with family, employers, education and government bureaucrats, and service providers, immigrants and their offspring are de facto citizens but the reification of the nation-state often denies them this reality de jure.

There have been some recent changes to this linear relation between citizen and state. Cities in the European Union must accept other European citizens, and some cities even accept some
"extra-communitarian" inhabitants as legal residents as soon as they register with the local police station (e.g., English or Germans in Spain). Global cities increasingly put their capital accumulation and growth needs before the interests of the nation-state within which they are geographically contained (Sassen, 2001). Cities also have the power to grant practical citizenship (e.g., New York, Barcelona), or not (e.g., Phoenix, Paris). The extent of immigrant sanctuary cities is exaggerated by both proponents and critics, yet the idea holds water comparatively and could potentially be fully realized, as it has been historically. These truly democratic policies of inclusion of all residents could be enacted top-down by enlightened technocrats or be demanded bottom-up by grassroots self-organizing, mobilization, and immigrant organizations. The right to the city should require first, the legal permission to be in a city; second, the right to enjoy public spaces and services; and third, the right of all residents to shape and change their city by their collective actions (Harvey, 2008; Lefebvre, 1968; Mitchell, 2003). This may sound utopian, but it could be possible. One way to partially realize it could be through immigrant organizations, civil groups, and NGOs.

Discussions about immigration in academia and the public sphere tend to be of two types. In the first, immigrants, especially undocumented ones, are constructed as illegal, antithetic to the nation-state, or a threat to national security and cultural integrity; they are framed as foreign bodies to a national society and eccentricities to the nation-state. They are people that one wishes would go back to their "natural" homes (Sayad, 2004; Weil, 2008). In the second type of discussion, immigrants are often seen as helpless victims trapped between an economic demand for their cheap labor and a political system that denies their rights. While the origins of these polar views are understandable sociologically, they hide the complexities of immigrants' everyday lives.

The label "illegal" cloaks important forms of de facto or everyday citizenship. Besides keeping transnational links with their communities of origin through remittances and modern channels of communication (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; M. P. Smith, 2003), after some time in their new places of residence, immigrants become embedded in local jobs, commuting routes, kin and friendship networks, and local institutions, in addition to their transnational commitments. They are active consumers who patronize local restaurants and businesses and pay for rent, groceries, transportation, and utilities. Where possible they may participate in immigrant enclaves and start their own businesses. Thus immigrants often participate in formal or informal chambers of commerce where they get into contact with local politicians and bureaucrats and by which they exercise some political power. For example, candidates running for public office in New York, and in the cities, states, and countries of origin, often meet with immigrant business groups and community organizations to look for their support, even though some of the members and constituents of these groups cannot vote (Jones-Correa, 1998). This is also increasingly the case in Barcelona, where many politicians including presidential candidates look to gain the support of new immigrants, even when sometimes their public rhetoric is opposed to illegal immigration. The Parisian case is the opposite, despite the fact that most people of foreign origin can vote. Politicians are reluctant to address immigrants and their children as a group since this would be negatively portrayed by the media and their opponents, and it would go against the nationalist agenda.

Political theory and legalistic approaches overemphasize legal national citizenship. Yet, an analytical view shows that citizenship may appear de facto even when lacking de jure. This does not mean that legal citizenship is unimportant, nor does it deny that those without formal citizenship are potentially more prone to abuses and deportation. Immigrants may act as de facto
citizens by participating in the labor market, bringing up families, paying taxes, participating in religious communities, volunteering, doing civil or social work, working for government agencies, acting as labor representatives or community organizers, forming community and neighborhood associations, and speaking at public events and in the media using their native language and that of their new country. Immigrant rights movements and organizations have an explicit political agenda, and while they rarely see all their claims addressed, they still act as political interest groups and can affect policy making; they act as *de facto* citizen groups even when many of their members may be undocumented or legal residents without the right to vote. The point here is that the concept of political activity includes much more than voting.

Who can participate in political and communal activities also varies across time and space. In New York, community residents and parents of school children do not need to be citizens or legal residents to vote in school board elections or to serve on community boards (Board of Elections, 2011; Jones-Correa, 1998). There have also been calls by local organizations and politicians to introduce resolutions to allow non-citizens to vote for mayoral and local elections. These resolutions have not passed city council because they would upset the *status quo*, but they could pass in the future if there were an open resident referendum on the issue. Similarly, Jordi Hereu, the Mayor of Barcelona, has called for Moroccan immigrants to be allowed to vote in municipal elections (if the Moroccan government reciprocates). "In the citizenship-building process, as well as all the social aspects, it is also necessary to work on political rights, so everyone can express themselves in the municipal elections," said the mayor during an official visit to Morocco (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2009). Paris, in contrast, requires citizenship or residency papers even for private sector transactions such as renting an apartment or signing a cell phone contract.

In New York, landlords prefer Mexican renters because they pay the rent on time, and due to their undocumented status, they neither cause trouble nor demand too much. Furthermore, they often show a "do-it-yourself" attitude when it comes to apartment repairs and dealing with emergencies (Fuentes, 2007; Thompson, 2007). Through their formal and informal economic activity and their own labor to fix up housing in bad condition, immigrant groups have revitalized whole neighborhoods that were in economic decline, many of which have been subsequently gentrified by urban planners and the middle classes. This has been the case in El Raval and downtown Barcelona (Qu and Spaans, 2009; Serra del Pozo, 2006), neighborhoods throughout New York like the Lower East Side (Zukin, 2010), and Eastern Paris (Pinçon and Pinçon-Charlot, 2004; 2009). Immigrants move to dangerous and decaying neighborhoods because of their affordability. By exercising their right to the city, they change these neighborhoods. Immigrants are often precursors to gentrification by making neighborhoods safer. By opening restaurants and stores they also make these areas more appealing to middle class people looking for affordable places to move. The paradox is that as a result of improving the living conditions and cultural and economic offerings of urban areas, immigrants are often displaced involuntarily because of increasing prices and pressures brought about by gentrification. So while immigrants greatly shape the city and make areas more livable, the ultimate benefits are often enjoyed by others who have a legal right to the city, access to highly paid jobs, and some leisure time to consume the new and increasingly expensive and exclusive services.
Conclusion

Dense associational fields can be seen as indicators of the degree of immigrants' "right to the city." While not all immigrants are part of immigrant associations because of fear or a lack of time, interest, or resources, the health and high-profile of immigrant rights organizations can act as a proxy for the level of tolerance that cities have towards immigrants. The existence of certified and tolerated immigrant and pro-immigrant human rights organizations creates discursive fields and forums to propose a right to the city for minorities and immigrants—despite issues of national citizenship—and thus for everyone. Inclusive institutional discourses reflect the *de facto* urban citizenship that immigrants have in the cities where they live, work, and conduct family and economic activities, and through which they thus contribute to and constitute an integral part of their communities. National governments should recognize what is a *fait accompli* and provide avenues for legal citizenship that further help to incorporate immigrants into the communities of which they are already part.

Different state-society relationships, citizenship ideological models, and civil society and institutional arrangements have differential effects for the larger minority groups in these three cities (Castañeda, 2010). Each city has something to learn from the other—both things to improve as well as things to celebrate. The final table (Table 6), summarizes five key comparisons made in this chapter.

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<th></th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>Paris</th>
<th>Barcelona</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship Ideology</td>
<td>Multicultural</td>
<td>Républicain</td>
<td>Multicultural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How Civil Society Can Organize</td>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Class</td>
<td>Cultural practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Funding for Ethnic Orgs.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium-Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Density of Organizational Field</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Citizenship</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The overall status of Latinos in the United States is aided by avenues of political voice and organization that benefit from the legacy of the civil rights movement and multicultural ideology. Even without having the largest voice of all groups, Latinos have a political voice that is heard in the streets, politicians' offices, and in the public sphere. Given its different history and ideology, France discourages communitarian discourses and thus robs disenfranchised, un-integrated, non-fundamentalist migrants not only of political voice but also of collective action and social capital. While many unemployed Muslim immigrants and citizens are disenfranchised from the French mainstream and from one another, Moroccans in Barcelona have social clubs, friendship networks within and across categorical groups, and a moderate political voice as city residents.

Unemployment and stigmatization are the major obstacles to a right to the city facing the offspring of immigrants in the Parisian metropolitan area (Castañeda, forthcoming). In New York, the challenges are the lack of papers and poverty wages. In Barcelona, they are local intolerance and stereotypes, which are often softened after social interactions in the public and private spheres. Practical everyday citizenship, including employment, cultural rights, freedom of religion, and avenues for political expression—as well as legal citizenship—are necessary in order to fully enjoy a right to the city and the country where new residents live.
Civil society and local socialization patterns foster processes of belonging and exclusion that are translated into different forms of contentious politics, exclusion, and everyday citizenship. Different configurations of social boundaries create parallel pathways of simultaneous exclusion and inclusion. These findings remind us how important everyday interactions, expectations, a sense of belonging, and de facto citizenship are, even when they may seem independent from policy goals and state-sanctioned markers of citizenship. The best possible scenario for immigrants is when legal citizenship and its associated welfare benefits and political rights are accompanied by de facto everyday citizenship, structural integration, and respect for cultural difference. None of these cities provides all of these conditions, but doing so would be beneficial for immigrants and their offspring. Providing these conditions would also benefit the receiving state, since immigrants would be allowed to contribute fully to their new societies.

Notes
1. Social integration of immigrants in this context does not mean forced cultural assimilation or cultural homogeneity, nor does it imply a normative ideal like that implicit in the Chicago School (see McQuarrie and Marwell, 2009). On the contrary, it follows William Bernard's procedural description of integration where "natives" and "newcomers" integrate with each other; "That is to say that each element has been changed by association with the other, without complete loss of its own cultural identity, and with a change in the resultant cultural amalgam...this concept of integration rests upon a belief in the importance of cultural differentiation within a framework of social unity. It recognizes the right of groups and individuals to be different so long as the differences do not lead to domination or disunity" (William S. Bernard, quoted in Gordon, 1964, p. 68).

2. This movement is parallel to the weakening of working class community organizations and political alliances and the general political disenfranchisement of peripheral urban areas in France often called the banlieues (see Castañeda, forthcoming).

3. This neo-liberal model clusters individuals by social class and/or race; and by excluding the poor and stigmatized groups from certain exclusive areas it decreases a universal right to the city. This was the model mastered by Von Haussmann in Paris and Robert Moses and his Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority in New York (Harvey, 2008). This model was also applied to Barcelona leading to the Olympic Games of 1992 (Qu and Spaans, 2009).

4. In the same way that the US Census does not ask about religion, the French Census does not have questions on race or ethnicity. It is considered illegal to use state resources to create statistical information that treats citizens as something other than French. While the US Census has questions about race and ethnicity, the categories change each decade and they are not self-explanatory or understood in the same way by respondents (Passel and Taylor, 2009). Furthermore the US Census clearly undercounts the number of poor minorities and undocumented workers that prefer not to or cannot give information to the state due to their unstable situation, frequent change of residence, and/or crowded and informal housing arrangements.

5. For a list of Muslim organizations in Spain see, for example, http://www.webislam.com/?sec=directorio.tipo=Organizaci%F3nes.

6. I have also observed the same while participating in cultural events organized by the Kabyle community in New York, including the celebration of the contentious events of the Berber Spring.

7. Despite the strong discourse against funding communitarian activities, some funds are allocated at the local level around cultural issues, or programs around social class, age, or disadvantaged status (see Doytcheva, 2007).
8. As in any closed social group newcomers have to pass a time of probation, where they may be asked to prove their worth and willingness to belong; e.g., new members rushing a fraternity in order to construct fictitious kinship relationships, in the same way that the nation-state imagines the common patrie or motherland.

9. This policy program was revamped after 9/11 to the point where the securitarian discourse has become commonplace and widespread.

10. Yet minorities in France have a lower imprisonment rate per capita than minorities in the US (Wacquant, 2010).

11. In a press release the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that despite failing to comply with his parole conditions, it will continue to defend Alejandro Ordaz Moreno. See: http://portal3.sre.gob.mx/english/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=233&Itemid=9 running from parole his.

12. Proposition 187 alleged that Californians suffered "economic hardship caused by the presence of illegal aliens" and called for the denial of public benefits such as health care, education, and welfare to illegal aliens. The citizen proposition was passed on November 8, 1994 and was supported by almost 59 percent of the California voters with a 60 percent voter turnout. It was signed into law by Governor Pete Wilson (R). Following lawsuits filed in by the Mexican-American Legal Defense/Education Fund (MALDEF), the League of Latin American Citizens (LULAC), the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), and others, Proposition 187 was ultimately declared unconstitutional by US District Court Judge Mariana Pfaelzer in November 1997. In 1999 Governor Gray Davis (D), an earlier supporter of the proposition, decided not to appeal this ruling, killing the proposition but yet inspiring federal immigration bills like the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 signed into law by President Bill Clinton.

13. HR 4437: The Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 was introduced by James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) on December 6, 2005 and passed by the House of Representatives on December 16, 2005, but the Senate did not vote on it. The bill asked for more funds for border control, larger jurisdiction of the Department of Homeland Security, and fingerprinting of non-citizens entering and leaving the country (all these aspects were later incorporated and enacted in other bills). HR 4437 was very controversial since Title II Sections 201 and 203 sought to make being in an undocumented status an "aggravated felony" criminal offense, instead of a civil one. Furthermore, ambiguous language could have made any person, agency or institution helping undocumented people who had been previously deported also guilty of criminal behavior. This enraged the Catholic Church, social service agencies, employers, and regular people who often come in contact with the undocumented and helped foster the large immigrants rights marches of 2006.

14. This law allows local police to ask "people who look foreign" for their identification papers with no other reason. This was normally considered discrimination or a form of racial profiling and is illegal in other US cities. Yet this is the law of the land in Paris.

References


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Remaking Urban Citizenship
Organizations, Institutions, and the Right to the City

Comparative Urban and Community Research, Volume 10

Michael Peter Smith and Michael McQuarrie, editors

New concepts of citizenship change the fabric of cities.

Due to heightened global migration and transnational mobility, many residents of the world’s cities lack national citizenship in the places to which they have moved for work, refuge, or retirement. The disjuncture between citizenship and daily life has led to devolution of claims from national to urban space. Within nation-states characterized by structured inequalities, citizens have not reduced their social differences. This leads increasingly to calls for greater direct involvement of marginalized classes in reshaping the institutions and spaces directly affecting their lives.

These concerns—cities without citizenship and people without political power—inform the agendas of organizations that seek to restructure urban citizenship in more democratic directions. Remaking Urban Citizenship focuses on the uses and limits of such political organizations and coalitions, shows the various ways they pursue expanded rights within the city, and describes the institutional changes necessary to empower global migrants and popular classes as urban citizens.

Offering individual or comparative case studies of cities in the United States, Europe, and China, contributions to this volume describe the development of actual practices of organizations working to reinvigorate citizenship at the urban scale. Collectively, they locate institutional forms that help migrants lay claim to their cities, show how migrants can become politically empowered, and identify how they can expand their rights or find other ways to belong.

Michael Peter Smith is distinguished research professor in community studies at the University of California, Davis. He is co-author of the award-winning book Citizenship across
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“are cities becoming more inclusive in response to claims of . . . rights by people who might not have legal status . . . ?”
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—Gianpaolo Baiocchi, Associate Professor of Sociology and International Studies, Brown University

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